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A STUDY ON AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION IN KOREA:
POLICY AND LEGAL ASPECTS OF CORPORATIZATION
AND LOCALIZATION OVER AIRPORT MANAGEMENT
SOON-KIL HONG*
KWANG

Eui Yoo**

I.

INTRODUCTION

T

HE AIRLINE industry is experiencing globalization like
other industries due to deregulation. In the future, airlines
may choose their base airport with greater freedom. Airport
owners and operators who realize this situation are trying to improve their facilities and services to attract major airlines. To
achieve such an objective, they need huge amounts of money
and efficient management. Most commercial airports belong to
the public sector, and it is very difficult to get enough money or
construct efficient management teams within the governmental
world. Therefore, airport owners and operators are devising the
privatization of airports to solve the problem. We may summarize the objectives of airport privatization as follows: economic
efficiency, private finance, and aggressive marketing.
It is necessary to understand the legal status of airports within
the ownership and operation context to initiate airport privatization in any country. In addition, the public interests related
to airport operation and public function of the airport system
should also be considered in any country. With a full understanding of the current legal status of airport ownership and operation and the public function of airport systems, we can find a
desirable method of implementing airport privatization.
All public airports in Korea are owned by the central government: the Ministry of Construction and Transportation owns
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civil aviation airports, and the Ministry of the National Defense
owns the military airports. The Korean Airport Authority
(KAA), an independent governmental body, operates the civil
aviation airports. Military airports are operated by the Army, Air
Force, Navy, or the U.S. Air Force in Korea. The majority of
civil airport operation is conducted by the KAA, while the private sector is allowed limited participation in airport operation.
The military airports where airlines are allowed to function are
jointly operated by the KAA and military authority. The airport
use agreement between the Ministry of Construction and Transportation and the Ministry of Defense for the civil use of these
airports is established. The operation of the landing field and
air traffic control around airports is usually under military authority while the terminal operation is conducted by the KAA.
For both civil and military airports, private sector participation
in airport operation is limited to passenger and civil airfreight
handling, a small portion of commercial activities in the terminal building, and ramp service for civil aircraft.
II.
A.

AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION

MOTIVATION OF AiRPORT PRIVATIZATION

Generally, privatization refers to shifting governmental functions and responsibilities to the private sector, in whole or in
part. The definition and meanings of airport privatization reviewed by empirical cases can include various concepts, such as:
(1) change of ownership from public to private sector; (2)
change of ownership from central to local government; (3)
change of legal status from autonomous governmental authority
to public corporate; (4) expansion of the private sector entities'
participation in airport operation without ownership; and (5)
private sector financing.
Motivation for airport privatization generally has three major
bases. First, it is necessary to induce the private sector because
government funds are limited to expand airport capacity to
meet air transport demand, which is rapidly increasing in total
volume and concentrating on hub airports. Second, by inviting
the private sector to participate in airport operation, it may be
possible to increase economic efficiency, which will result in improved airport revenue and profit performance. In some cases,
airport privatization is initiated according to political decisions
to privatize overall public organization. Third, airlines have
more freedom to choose hub airports for their flight service
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networking, according to the recently developed deregulation
or open-sky policy of the international air transport industry.
Until now, airlines were forced to use certain airports as their
hubs or bases, because some business environments are constructed by rigid bilateral agreement of international air service.
In the near future, however, airlines may be in a position to
choose base or hub airports by focusing on economical reasons
with less consideration of regulatory agreements between
governments.
Accordingly, airport operators' primary objective should be
making their airports attractive to airlines, and they should take
steps toward privatization to fulfill this goal. As we all know, a
marketing-oriented mind could hardly be secured within a public sector organization. Fortunately, the three major bases for
motivating airport privatization- (1) inducing private sector
funding, (2) inviting the private sector to participate in airport
operations, and (3) allowing airlines to choose base or hub airports for purely economic reasons-have already been initiated
around the world.
III.
A.

ADVANTAGES AND RISKS OF AIRPORT
PRIVATIZATION
ADVANTAGES OF AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION 1

We may summarize several advantages of airport privatization
by referring to its three motivation bases. We may also infer
some additional advantages by examining the benefits gained
from the privatization of the British Airports Authority (BAA),
which is considered the best example of airport privatization in
the world.
First, privatization makes it easier to access private sector capital. The government funds available for airport facilities are
usually very limited and private investors are extremely interested in investing in airports because people consider airport
revenues to be relatively stable and promising. Prior to privatization, the BAA's capital expenditure was controlled by government fiscal policy and constrained by limits on public-sector
borrowing. Since privatization, however, the BAA has been
freed from such financial constraints. It is now able to fund its
development using normal commercial sources. During the ini-

ISee Norman Payne, Presentation at AOCI Seattle Conference (1989);
Spencer Dickerson, To Privatize Or Not To Privatize, AIRPORT MAGAZINE, May/
June 1990, at 7.
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tial period of its privatization, the BAA doubled its annual capital investment level by modernizing terminals at Heathrow and
Gatwick Airports, building a new terminal at Stansted, adding
hotels at Heathrow and Gatwick, and planning the construction
of a high-speed rail between Heathrow and Central London.
Second, privatization enables airport operators to exploit
other organizational opportunities in and adjacent to their airports. Many people come to airports and this makes various
businesses possible. People that come to airports are usually
neither the poor nor the lower class. Rather, they are relatively
affluent and active in their businesses. Such an environment
can give airport operators a variety of business opportunities.
For example, the BAA rapidly diversified after privatization in
1987. As such, it moved into hotel operation and property development. The BAA also used its airport expertise to win contracts to manage shopping facilities in hospitals. It took
advantage of its successful experience in airport consulting work
and won several airport management contracts.
Third, privatization will lead to efficient economic operation.
This view is based partly on the belief that privately owned utilities are likely to be run more efficiently than publicly owned
entities. As private airports would be driven by profit, the allocation of resources would be more efficient, and business judgment, rather than political considerations, would be used to
conduct operations. For example, after privatization, the BAA
experienced a higher rate of augmentation in operating profit
without increasing the airfield user charge. This was achieved
through an increase in revenue by market-oriented operation
and by a reduction of operation cost. Its former large Head Office was downsized from some 800 to 100 people. In addition,
another great incentive created by privatization enables the staff
to own shares in the business. Their participation is evident by
the fact that over 98% of the staff currently owns shares. Unfortunately, however, the economic efficiency caused by promoting
competition, which is usually expected in privatization, has not
been achieved through airport privatization. This is due to the
monopolistic position of airports in the current system of aviation regulation. But with the trend of international deregulation of the air transport industry, the monopolistic status of
airport operation will collapse gradually. Afterwards, airport
privatization may improve the economic efficiency caused by
competition between airports.
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Fourth, privatized airports may pursue marketing-oriented
management. This will improve the level of customer-service for
airlines and air passengers. Currently, many airports face intensified cost pressure from their carriers. Marketing-oriented
management may lead to a reduction of the airfield user charge,
thereby complementing the deficit with the income accrued
from vigorous commercial activities in the terminal buildings.
For example, in phase 1 of the Australian airport privatization,
which occurred through the simultaneous trade sales of the Melbourne, Brisbane, and Perth airports, all three successful bidders committed themselves to real aeronautical price reduction
between 18% and 24.5% over the first five years. Moreover, Copenhagen airport, privatized in 1993, has also extended its commercial interests over recent years, thereby reducing the
revenue portion from airport charge and augmenting the revenue portion from commercial income.
Table 1
Revenue structure of Copenhagen Airport
1993

1996

Airport Charge

60%

51%

Commercial Income

29%

39%

7%

7%

2%

3%

Property Income
Other Income

1

Source: Credit Swisse First Boston, Proposal to KOACA to provide FinancialAdvisory Service for
Inchon InternationalAirport, Feb. 1999, Seoul Korea.

B.

ALLEGED RISKS OF AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION

2

Most large commercial airports were constructed by the public sector as public facilities. As such, airport system planners in
government organizations have emphasized the public function
of airport operations. Therefore, airport privatization inevitably
entails some risks. Currently, only around 2% of the world's airports are fully or partially privatized, and the U.S. has hesitated
to join the trend of airport privatization for its major airports.
2 See RiGAs DOGANIS, THE AIRPORT BUSINESS 28-33 (1992); Spencer Dickerson,
To Privatize Or Not To Privatize,AIRPORT MAGAZINE, May/June 1990, at 7; Kwang
Eui Yoo, A Comparative Study of Orlando International Airport's Financial
Position Under the Assumption That It Has Been Privatized (1992) (unpublished
Graduate Research Project, Embry-Riddel Aeronautical University) (on file with
author).
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First, there are risks of monopolistic abuse. Many large airports enjoy a monopolistic status. Through privatization, airport managers may reduce space for passengers and, cargo
shippers to maximize revenues from a variety of commercial activities. This will necessarily deteriorate the quality of service.
Consequently, monopolistic abuse may arise through unreasonable increases in airport user-charges. As demonstrated by the
BAA and Australian privatization examples, however, regulators
may be able to rectify such problems:
Second, there are risks associated with the loss of government
control over airports. For example, safety standards may be relaxed resulting in a threat to public safety. Moreover, airport
systems have a functional role in national defense. With privatized airports, if a national crisis situation arises, the appropriate
government officials may not be allowed to take immediate action. Furthermore, there are also some chances that privatized
airports would not support a national system of transportation,
but rather act for profit-motive as opposed to public utility.
Third, there are risks related to narrow responsibility. When
an airport is in the public sector, there is a chance to input citizens' opinions of quality service through the elective process,
and airport management teams might be considered to have a
responsibility to the general public. Privatized airports' management teams, however, may become over-sensitive to fluctuations
in the share price and their decisions may well be influenced by
this economic factor. For instance, the BAA has become much
more secretive since privatization because of concerns that any
information may have an impact on its share price.
Fourth, the diversification of operation pursued by privatized
airports may also be dangerous. Diversification away from airport business has proven highly risky in the BAA's experiences.
As the BAA moved into other activities, such as property development, senior management's energies became dissipated.
Moreover, airports that are part of conglomerates may lose
their flexibility and speed of response. As a result, the BAA
refocused its efforts on its core airport business in 1990. To this
end, the non-airport hotels were sold and the three London airport hotels were leased to major hotel chains. At the same time,
the BAA has renewed its emphasis on expanding airport retailing and selling its expertise in this area to other airports.
3

See discussion, supra Part III.A.
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METHODS OF AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION

The definition of airport privatization may vary depending on
the countries where it is used. It can range from the sale of an
entire airport to the private sector by floating on the stock market, to the change of control related to airport operation from a
central to a local government. According to several previous
case reviews, the methods of airport privatization can be summarized in the following four ways.4
1. Public Sales by Flotation
Public sales of an existing airport by floating shares on the
stock market is the most fundamental way of privatization. It is
agreed that the British government's conversion of the BAA into
a private company is the best example of airport privatization by
this method. Shares of the BAA, which were previously owned
by the British government, were floated through a public stock
offering on the London Stock Exchange in 1987. Copenhagen
and some other airports also partially sold their shares through
the stock market. When this method is adopted, governments
should devise a way to reserve the right to control airport operations for the protection of public safety and utility.
2.

Trade Sales

The advantage of airport privatization through trade sales is
that the benefit of privatization can still be profoundly obtained
while retaining the necessary governmental control. The most
large-scale and recent example of a trade sale is the Federal Airports Corporation of Australia's privatization. The Australian
government completed phase 1 sales of three airports-Melbourne, Perth, and Brisbane-in 1997. The sale consisted of
fifty-year long-term leases plus 49 year options. Foreign ownership was limited to 49% while a 5% ownership limit was placed
on airlines. The winning consortia included the BAA, Amsterdam Schiphol, and Airport Group International as airport
operator.
3.

Contract Operation

Contract operation is the easiest and most popular way to invite the private sector into airport operation. A private company
may be contracted to operate selected services or virtually the
4 See Norman Ashford & Clifton A. Moore, Airport Finance 87-91

(1992).
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entire airport operation. The best known U.S. example of a
large airport being operated by a private firm is the Burbank
Airport in California. Since 1978, Lockheed Air Terminal has
operated the airport, with remaining ownership in an airport
authority comprised of the cities of Burbank, Glendale, and
Pasadena. Similarly, the BAA won a contract to manage the retail activities at Pittsburgh airport and took over the management of the Indianapolis airport system.
4.

Build-Operate-Transfer(BOT)

The BOT means that a government contracts with a private
consortium to finance, design, build, and operate a major facility, with title eventually reverting to the government once payment for the investment is complete. Toronto's terminal 3 was
the first major project of this type. In Turkey, a Lockheed-led
team, including several Turkish firms, developed a terminal at
Istanbul Airport with the expectation to operate it.
IV. AIRPORT SYSTEMS AND ATMOSPHERE RELATED TO
PRIVATIZING AIRPORTS IN KOREA
A.

KOREAN AIRPORT SYSTEMS, OWNERSHIP, AND OPERATION

In Korea, there are 16 airports that offer scheduled air transport service: four international airports and twelve domestic airports. The central government owns all of these airports. The
Ministry of Construction and Transportation and the Ministry of
Defense are responsible for these airports. Kimpo International
Airport, which belongs to the system of civil airports, handles
more than half of the total air traffic. Table-2 shows the summary of Korean airports' ownership and a scale depicting the
number of passengers handled annually.
The KAA is the autonomous governmental organization responsible for operating and managing civil airports without
ownership. The airport operational works commissioned to the
KAA are ranged as follows: (1) maintenance and operation of
the landing field, including the runway, taxiway, and ramp area
for aircraft movement; (2) management of passenger and cargo
terminals; (3) airport security, fire fighting, and accident handling; (4) the operation and maintenance of the Instrument
Landing System, Air Navigation facilities, and communication
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systems; and (5) Environmental protection-including noise
problems as wells as water and air pollution.5
Almost all of the airport operation commissioned to the KAA
is conducted directly by KAA employees or the airlines. The Korean Tourism Authority mainly operates the duty-free shopping;
while private sector entrepreneurs conduct governmental organization and only an immaterial portion of duty-free shopping
and commercial activities in the passenger terminals.
Table 2
Ownership and control of Korean Public Airports
Rank

Airport

Ownership & Control

Passenger volume (thousand)

1

Kimpo Int'l

MOCT (Ministry of
Construction and
Transportation)

2

Kimhae Int's

Air Force

9,956

3
4

Cheju Int'l

MOCT
Air Force

9,819

Kwangju Domestic

5

Taegu Domestic

Air Force

2,173

6

Ulsan Domestic

MOCT

1,691

7

Pohang Domestic

Navy

1,125

8

Yeosu Domestic

MOCT

982

9

36,489

2,862

Chinju Domestic

Air Force

967

10

Kangung Domestic

Air Force

900

11

Kunsan

US Air Force

457

12

Sockcho Domestic

Army

437

13

Yeochon Domestic

Air Force

390

14

Chungju Int'l

Air Force

371

15

Mockpo Domestic

Navy

298

16

Wonju Domestic

Air Force

122

Source: Korea Civil Aviation Development Association, Aviation Statistics, Seoul Korea, 1998.

The appropriate military units operate military airports, and
the use agreement between the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation and the Ministry of Defense was established for
the civil use of military airports. The airlines or civil aircraft operators pay a fee to the Ministry of Defense for using military
airport facilities, buildings, and land. The aircraft landing fees
for airline aircraft is paid to the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation. Revenue collected by landing charges must,
5 See Table

2.
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however, be used for landing field maintenance and operation.
The passenger and cargo terminals as well as the accompanying
facilities to be used for the ground handling of civil traffic are
constructed and maintained by the Ministry of Construction and
Transportation. The KAA and the airlines are responsible for
terminal operations.'
The Korean government is currently constructing a new Seoul
Airport, named Inchon International Airport (11A). Because of
a dramatic increase in air transport demand in the 1980's, the
Korean government recognized the urgent need to expand airport capacity for the Seoul area. The existing Kimpo International Airport, however, has limited ability for expansion. The
master plan for development for IIA was announced in 1992,
and the ground breaking occurred in the same year. The Korean government established the Korea Airport Construction
Authority (KOACA) in 1994, an autonomous governmental organization, to facilitate IIA's construction. After the first phase
of construction is completed in late 2000, the airport will have
an annual capacity of 170,000 flights, 27 million passengers, and
1.7 million tons of cargo. Upon completion of the last phase in
2020, IIA will be capable of handling 100 million passengers using only four runways. It is estimated that the first phase of construction will cost 5.3 trillion Korean Won (U.S. $4.4 billion).
The Korean government's investment is planned to be 3.3 trillion Korean Won (U.S. $2.7 billion). The remainder, 2.0 trillion Korean Won (U.S. $1.7 billion) is planned to be raised
7
from domestic and overseas capital markets.
B.

ATMOSPHERE RELATED

To

PRIVATIZING AiRPORTS IN KOREA

Virtually the entire Korean economic system is undergoing
renovation motivated by the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), starting in late 1997. The Planning and Budgeting
Board, an entity recently established to organize the renovation,
has formulated the policy and law for a dramatic renovation of
the Korean economic system. As a result, the Board developed
laws to privatize public enterprises, such as the airport system. It
has been generally recognized that the current airport operation in Korea is very inefficient and the quality of service is extremely low. Only Kimpo International Airport recorded a
6 See Korean Government Agreement for the Civilian Use of Military Aerodomes, art. 4, 5, 7, 11 (1998).
7 See KOACA, Introduction to Inchon International Airport Project (1997).
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profit recently, while the other airports have been consistently
suffering. Even at Kimpo International Airport, however, nonaeronautical revenue has been extremely low, which means the
airport's financial operation is not desirable.'
The Korean government has tried to promote the investment
of private sector funds to pubic facilities with the incentive that
investors can operate the facilities and earn profits. Private sector participation in the funding and operating of public facilities may lead to improved economic efficiency. This policy is
currently being applied to airport systems. For example, IIA's
cargo terminals, fueling systems, and electric power systems are
being constructed by private sector investors. The terminal
buildings and parking facilities for local domestic airports are
also being considered as facilities to attract private investors." In
addition, the Korean government changed KOACA's legal status
from a governmental authority to a public corporation named
"A Corporation" in February 1999 to facilitate the privatization
process of the airport. IIA Corporation was created to operate
the airport as well as ongoing construction. The Korean central
government is also currently trying to change the KAA's legal
status to a public corporation to facilitate the privatization process of existing airports. Even though the government has not
finalized its detailed proposal, the conceptual outline of the
KAA corporation may be summarized as follows: (1) the KAA's
legal status is changed from an autonomous governmental authority to a public corporation, temporarily named Korea Airport Corporation (KAC); (2) KAC is composed of shares; (3)
KAC will be allowed to issue corporate bonds; (4) KAC will be
allowed to commission the right of airport operation to other
organizations; and (5) KAC may be allowed to utilize international debt financing.)

C.

KOREAN AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION POLICY

Airport privatization should be pursued in such a way as to
maximize the advantages and minimize the risks."' For existing
civil airport systems operated by the KAA, improving economic
efficiency and the quality of service should be the main objective
8 See KAA, Financial Report (1998).
9 See KOACA, Introduction to Inchon International Airport Project (1997).
H, See id.
I See discussion, supra Part III (explaining the advantages and risks of airport
privatization).
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of privatization. The efficient use of facilities may be considered
the prime concern for military airports. For IIA, the endeavor
should be focused on inducing investment funds from the private sector.
1. PrivatizationPolicy For Existing Civil Airport Systems In Korea
There are four existing public airports in the civil airports system in Korea: two international airports and two domestic airports.' 2 All four are operated and managed by the KAA. The
objective of privatizing these airports should be directed toward
improving economic efficiency. This means minimizing costs
and maximizing revenues, improving the quality of service, and
developing air transport demand. To strengthen the advantages
of privatization, it is desirable to separate these four airports and
privatize each of them as independent airports. The separated
airports may then compete against each other, which will lead to
more efficient operations and higher quality service. The Ministry of Construction and Transportation should coordinate with
the local governments where each of the airports are located to
establish detailed planning regarding privatizing each airport as
an independent entity. Of course, this is based on the assumption that partial ownership of the civil airports has been transferred to the local governments." 3 As a privatization method,
the authors suggest a selective contract operation for the privatization of these airports. Public sales by floatation or trade sales can
generate too many problems regarding public interests and
safety. For example, the national defense system requires public
control of the airport facilities, which might be undermined
with privatization via public sales by floatation or trade sales. In addition, the monetary valuation for public sales byfloatation or trade
sales is not easy with the financial data obtained from the current accounting system.
A selective contract operation is easy to apply, because it is possible with only an evaluation of the operating costs and revenues.
This method can also contribute to the improvement of efficiency. If airport operations are divided into various operational areas and contracted accordingly, it may be simple to
estimate the value of assets, and performance improvement can
also be easily secured by inviting competent private entrepreneurs to operate within each area of the airports. If it is neces12

See Table 2.

1.3See discussion, infra Part IV.D.
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sary to add capacity in the future for existing airports, however,
we can consider the BOT method to solve problems related to
obtaining enough money to overcome the limitations of public
sector funds.
2.

PrivatizationPolicy For Military Airports

It is impossible to privatize the airside facilities of military airports with the current legal constraints and atmosphere. Therefore, we can introduce privatization concepts for only the
landslide operations. Accordingly, selective contract operation is
the only feasible way to apply privatization to military airports.
Thereby, the operation of passenger and cargo terminals as well
as ramp service for civil aircraft can be contracted to private
entities.
3.

PrivatizationPolicy For Inchon InternationalAirport (11A)

The Korean government cannot provide all the money required to construct IIA. The first phase of construction will cost
5.3 trillion Korean Won (U.S. $4.4 billion). The Korean government's investment is planned to be 3.3 trillion Korean Won
(U.S. $2.7 billion) and the remainder, 2.0 trillion Korean Won
(U.S. $1.7 billion), is planned to be raised from domestic and
overseas capital markets. 4 Consequently, the Korean government will own 63% of the total IIA shares, leaving 37% of the
ownership to the private sector. Thereby, the government will
retain the power to control the direction of IIA's operation and
protect public safety and interests. Therefore, it is realistic to
consider the partial privatization of IIA.
There are not enough human resources to operate a hyperscale international airport in Korea-especially considering Korea does not have a sufficient quantity of experts or business
people with profound knowledge and experience in airport operation. Consequently, the privatization of IIA should be pursued to solve the funding problem as well as the airportoperating problem.
It is necessary to invite some consortia with the ability to fund
the capital required and the appropriate operating and managing skills. Fortunately, there are some foregoing examples of
these kinds of consortia that have formulated and succeeded in
winning the airport privatization program bid. 5 The consortia,
14
15

See discussion, infra Part IV.D.
See also discussion, supra Part 1ILA; Part III.C.2.

JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE

composed of international airport operators and financial partners, won the bids for three Australian airports' privatization
process in 1997.16 These consortia included the BAA, Amsterdam Schiphol, and Airport Group International of the U.S. as
airport operator. The conversion of the government controlled
entity's legal status to a corporation should be accomplished
before bidding is initiated to encourage such consortia to fund
and operate the IIA.
D.

1.

LEGAL ASPECTS OF AIRPORT PRIVATIZATION

Ownership And Control

According to the current Korean Domestic Aviation Law statute, ownership and control of civil airports belongs to the central government. This might be the main cause of inefficient
airport operation. Only the minimum level of government ownership and control of civil airports is required to protect public
interests and national defense, while the maximum portion of
airport operation control should be transferred to the local government and the private sector. The overall matters related to
airport operation should be under the local government's control and it should try to invite the private sector's participation
to improve efficiency. That is, the local government will have a
more significant economic impact by the airport's prosperity
than the central government. In addition, the competition between local governments may stimulate the airport's operational
organization to improve efficiency. Therefore, it is necessary to
revise the law to transfer a substantial proportion of the ownership and control of existing civil airports from the central government to the local government. The central government,
however, may reserve the right to take over the management of
any airport in the event of war, or any other national crisis, and
also reserve the right to limit the change of airport land uses.
The central government should also reserve control over the allocation of landing slots at international airports. These
changes are necessary to fulfill the provisions in the bilateral
agreements of air services and to protect public interests
efficiently.
The same philosophy could be applied to IIA. Currently, the
central government has complete ownership and control of IIA.
After partial privatization, however, public ownership and con16

See discussion, supra Part III.C.2.
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trol of 11A will be solely limited to the central government, according to the current law and plan. This might lead to less
optimistic policy development than in the case of local government participation. The local government for IIA, Intone City,
might have greater interests in IAA's prosperity in some respects
than the central government. Therefore, it is necessary to revise
the law concerning this matter to secure Intone City's participation through allocating some portion of investment to the city
government. The authors suggest that Intone City should have
more shares than central government, because the central government's shares are for national defense and to protect public
interests while Intone city's shares are for the economic efficiency and prosperity of IIA. The central government may, however, reserve the right to take over IIA in case of a national crisis
and the right to limit the change of airport land use. The power
to control the allocation of landing slots should also be reserved
to the'central government. These changes are necessary because the central government must maintain the power to control the utilization of the gateway airport facilities for national
security and international relations in aviation.
For the military aerodromes that are co-used with civil air carriers, the control and ownership for airside facilities cannot be
transferred to civil authority because of national defense
problems. It is necessary to enact new law, however, to secure
the landslide facilities for civil utilization, which should be
placed under civilian control. The law and regulation regarding
the operation of airside facilities and space should also be revised to make it possible to reflect civilian users' opinions easily
and timely. The current relevant statutes stipulate that the
agreements between the Minister of Defense and the Minister of
Construction and Transportation are indispensable-even for
trivial operational changes. This has lead to a slow reaction
time, thereby causing inefficiency. There are quite a few aviation experts in Korea who insist that an authoritative entity
should be created to control both the civil and military aviation-like the U.S.'s Federal Aviation Administration (FAA)for more efficient national airspace utilization.
2.

Abusing Monopolistic Status

The potential of abuse by a monopolistic entity is one of the
most pressing issues with the notion of airport privatization. Especially regarding airport user-charges, it may be necessary for
the central government to intervene to protect public interests
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from being abused by monopolistic pricing behavior. The U.K.
government, for example, controls the amount of aeronautical
charges, such as aircraft landing and passenger fees expressed as
revenue per passenger. The U.K. government allows the three
privatized London airports to raise aeronautical charges each
year by an amount equivalent to no more than the increase in
the retail price index (RPI) minus 1%. The U.K. Monopolies
and Mergers Commission may also examine these airports every
five years. The U.K. Civil Aviation Authority (CAA) can investigate complaints against airports of discrimination or abuse of
dominant position, when they are made by airport users.17
It is necessary to enact legislation to prevent abuse by monopolistic, privatized organizations that participate in airport operations. To control monopolistic pricing, it may be necessary at
first to establish regulations that require the production of more
detailed accounts than are normally required under the Companies Acts. The appropriate governmental department should
formulate regulating schemes against monopolistic pricing
based on an examination and analysis of these accounting data.
3. Legislative Needs For The Airport System's FinancialIntegrity
Some civil airports do not have sufficient air traffic demand.
For example, Yeosu and Ulsan airports cannot generate enough
revenue to cover their operating costs. On the other hand, due
to the level of traffic demand, Kimpo International Airport is
positioned to generate high profits, and Cheju International
Airport may have the ability to generate enough revenue to
meet its total operating costs. Therefore, it is necessary to transfer the appropriate portion of revenue generated from Kimpo
International Airport to Yeosu and Ulsan airports. To address
this problem, the authors suggest that the government enact
new legislation to create a revenue pooling system of aeronautical charges, or an aeronautical revenue transfer system among
the airports, mutually agreed upon where necessary and
available.
V. CONCLUSION
The trend of airport privatization around the world does not
have a long history, but it is being widely developed by applying
various methods depending on the situations related to individ17

See Rigas Doganis, The Airport Business 30 (1992).
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ual airports' legal status and operational characteristics. The
major advantages of airport privatization are the possibility to
access private sector capital and the improvement of economic
efficiency in operation. Airport privatization may, however, undermine public interests. For example, matters regarding national defense and safety the integral balancing of the
transportation system, the equitable use of airport facilities,
maintaining the appropriate quality of service, and abuse by monopolistic corporations are all potentially problematic issues.
National defense is still the major issue in Korea. Airport
privatization cannot develop further without considering the national security problem and safety matters. In addition, the economic valuation of airport facilities in Korea is not easy, because
the KAA has directly conducted most airport operations. Considering the situation in Korea, this research suggests that there
are two realistic and basic methods of airport privatization at the
initial stage: selective contracts and Build-Operate-Transfers(BOTs).
These methods can secure the improvement of economic efficiency by inviting private sector entrepreneurs to participate in
airport operations. In addition, the authors recommend that
the ownership and control of civil airports should be gradually
transferred from the central government to local governments,
thus separating the currently consolidated operational responsibilities of the KAA to each independent airport's operational
organizations. This de-consolidation will make each airport
competitive and serve as an incentive for local governments to
try to improve the efficiency and effectiveness of their airport
operations.
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